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The Right to a Public Trial in the
Time of COVID-19
By Stephen E. Smith*
Abstract
Maintaining social distance in the time of COVID-19 is a
public health priority. A crowded courtroom is an environment
at odds with public health needs. Accordingly, until science
determines otherwise, it will be necessary for judges to manage
courtroom attendance and exclude the public from trials, wholly
or in part. Courtrooms may be closed to the public, despite the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial, when the closure is
justified by a strong government interest and is narrowly
tailored to further that interest. Typically, this heightened
scrutiny is applied on a case-by-case basis and turns on a case’s
specific circumstances. This Article proposes that in this period
of pandemic, with indisputably strong government interests in
public health and with few means available beyond closure to
satisfy those interests, courtroom closures may be ordered by trial
courts, and approved by appellate courts, almost categorically. It
further suggests that there are alternative protections available
that may be employed by courts to further the Sixth Amendment’s
good government purposes in this time of emergency.
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I. Introduction
In 2020, with the novel coronavirus producing both illness
and government responses intended to reduce its spread, courts
nationwide have issued orders continuing criminal trials,
essentially closing the courts.1 Even the Supreme Court
postponed oral arguments for the current term.2 These orders
largely deferred trials of all kinds. No responsible judge wants
to bring people together to empanel a jury when that would risk
exposing prospective jurors and court staff to the virus.
Should courts determine, however, with the passage of
time, that a jury may be convened to try the backlog of cases
before it, the question remains, how populated should the
1.
See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL., SECOND AMENDED
GENERAL ORDER 20-0012 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/89HN-4SLG (PDF);
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF S.F., APRIL 13, 2020 GENERAL ORDER RE:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF (Apr. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc
/NK5Q-FBSQ (PDF).
2.
See COVID-19 Announcements, SUP. CT OF THE U.S., https://perma.cc
/X3T2-GZE4 (last visited May 19, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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courtroom be? With the need for pandemic-mandated social
distancing likely to persist for months, if not years, some sort of
accommodations will have to be made. Juries will need to be
empaneled, eventually. But will jurors be able to sit a few inches
from one another, per previous common practice? Or will they
have to be spaced throughout the courtroom, to prevent the
transmission of the virus through droplets or aerosolized
material?
Beyond the jury itself, what about the courtroom audience?
It seems to be a given that they must, at least, be kept apart.3
But public health needs might recommend excluding them
altogether. The fewer attendees at a trial, the fewer
opportunities for the virus to spread.
The exclusion of spectators presents a constitutional
problem. The Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal
defendants the right to a public trial.4 “Our country’s public trial
guarantee reflects the founders’ wisdom of the need to cast
sunlight—the best of disinfectants—on criminal trials.”5 The
right is implicated if spectators are excluded from a criminal
trial, absent waiver of the right by the defendant.6 This Article
addresses the Sixth Amendment implications of courtroom
management options that require closure. It also proposes that
closures ordered in response to the COVID-19 crisis should pass
constitutional muster almost categorically, rather than as
determined on a case by case basis. Finally, it reviews
procedural tools that may help further the values of the right to
a public trial, even in a closure situation.
II. A Vision of the COVID-Era Courtroom
A COVID courtroom is likely one without any members of
the public, but could also be one with some select members of
the public admitted. The essential participants in a criminal
3.

See Social Distancing: Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread, CTRS.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/53HS-9H7Z (last
visited May 19, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 607 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
6.
See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619–20 (1960) (indicating
that a defendant may waive his right to a public trial).
FOR
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trial include the defendant and counsel, the judge, the
prosecutor, and the jury. A court reporter is common, but could
conceivably be replaced by a recording device. A bailiff or
courtroom clerk is customary. In some courtrooms, these diverse
players may be kept apart by the six feet prescribed by the
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) and other
agencies.7 Many state and federal courtrooms, however, would
have difficulty positioning twelve jurors six feet apart, and
would not be able to accommodate trial spectators beyond the
essential participants while honoring social distancing
protocols.
Even greater practical problems may be faced by judges and
courtroom staff trying to manage large venire panels from which
juries are chosen in individual cases. These can consist of many
dozens, even hundreds of potential jurors, who have to be
shepherded to courtrooms for voir dire.8 Indeed, many
courtroom closure cases arise in the context of voir dire
proceedings and the management of prospective jurors in a
courtroom while a jury is being selected.9 While these
complexities may be practically overwhelming, they are not
necessarily constitutional in nature.
Accordingly, this Article is addressed to the specific image
of the COVID courtroom during trial—one featuring essential
participants, and either entirely without spectators or with a
limited number of them. Presuming that no spectators may
attend trial, trials convened with only essential participants
would be considered closed for Sixth Amendment purposes.10
Trials held with only some spectators, excluding those beyond
some permitted number, would be considered partially closed
under common Sixth Amendment jurisprudence developed in
the lower courts.11 In case of either a closure or partial closure,

7.

See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319 (2010) (noting a venire
panel of 60–100 potential jurors).
9.
See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 210 (2010); United States
v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 2012).
10.
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 42 (1984) (treating as closed, for Sixth
Amendment purposes, a courtroom “closed to all persons other than witnesses,
court personnel, the parties, and the lawyers”).
11.
See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
8.
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some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny would be
applied to determine the propriety of the closure.12
III. Sixth Amendment Scrutiny
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”13 The
right to a public trial is not absolute, however.14 Some closures
are permissible. In Waller v. Georgia,15 the Supreme Court set
forth the test trial courts should apply to determine whether a
courtroom closure is appropriate.
The Court prescribed a four-part test to determine whether
a closure complies with the Sixth Amendment:
[1] the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance
an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that
interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make
findings adequate to support the closure.16

Waller’s test is in the nature of strict scrutiny.17 While
Waller requires that the government interest pursued through
a courtroom closure be an “overriding” one,18 rather than
employing the commonly used strict scrutiny language of a
“compelling” interest,19 it is indistinguishable. The strict
scrutiny of Waller is an unusual kind, however—one steeped in
12.

See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14.
See Waller, 467 U.S. at 45.
15.
467 U.S. 39 (1984).
16.
Id. at 48 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
511–12 (1984) (establishing a test for a courtroom closure case arising under
the First Amendment)).
17.
See Commonwealth v. Chism, 65 N.E.3d 1171, 1178 (Mass. 2017)
(referring to the “strict scrutiny test articulated in Waller”). Cf. In re Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) (observing
that “[t]he Supreme Court has most recently spoken as if closure orders must
meet the test of strict scrutiny”)).
18.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
19.
See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (setting forth strict
scrutiny test in the First Amendment context).
13.
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the practicalities of courtroom management. Strict scrutiny has
been famously described as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”20
It is not so when courtroom management is at stake.21
A. The Government Interests Satisfied by a COVID Closure
1. Overriding Interests to Support Complete Closures
Interests that courts have found “overriding” for purposes
of the Waller test are typically responsive to the safety, privacy,
and emotional needs of particular courtroom participants.
Perhaps unremarkably, “[t]he safety of law enforcement officers
‘unquestionably’ may constitute an overriding interest.”22
Similarly, those officers’ privacy (which may also implicate their
safety) qualifies: “[T]he State has an ‘overriding interest’ in
protecting the identity of its undercover officers.”23 Courts have
also frequently justified closures to protect the emotional
well-being of child witnesses.24
Protecting public health is indisputably an “overriding”
interest.25 Protecting the public from unnecessarily spreading a
potentially fatal virus is not only a purpose the government may
pursue; it is one it has an obligation to. The values served by the
right to a public trial are important ones, but are, in almost all
cases, hypothetical. There is little danger, in the ordinary case,
20.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
21.
Cf. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 819–20
(2006) (noting that judicial actions reviewed under strict scrutiny are upheld
at a rate of fifty-eight percent).
22.
Moss v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 2017).
23.
Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
24.
See, e.g., Bowers v. Michigan, No. 16-2325, 2017 WL 1531958, at *1
(6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (“[T]he victim was twelve years old when she testified,
her testimony was sensitive, and the closure was done to protect the victim
from embarrassment and shame.”).
25.
See Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 43 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he
Government clearly has a compelling interest in safeguarding the public
health by regulating the health care and insurance markets.”); Legatus v.
Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“The court has no doubt
that every level of Government has an interest in promoting public health as
a general matter . . . .”).
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of wrongdoing by the trial’s participants that requires the
watchful eye of the public to stamp out. The danger to the health
of the trial’s essential participants, any would-be spectator, and
the people they encounter after leaving the courtroom, on the
other hand, is considerably more acute.
There are cases indicating that closures justified by nothing
more than tight quarters—a lack of room for both jury
candidates and the public—lack an overriding interest.26 But
those are very different circumstances. In the ordinary
course—pre-COVID days—accommodations may be made for
substantial numbers of people: a shifted table here, an extra
seat there. Social distancing requires strict limits on the number
of people in the courtroom. If the justification offered is one of
convenience and relatively straightforward logistics, it should
not be considered “overriding.” That is not the case in the
COVID courtroom. Its spacing requirements arise from vital
public health needs.
2. “Substantial Reasons” to Support Partial Closures.

The Waller test has been applied not only to complete
closures of trial proceedings, but also to partial closures of court
proceedings. As the terms have developed, a complete courtroom
closure is one in which all non-participating individuals are
excluded from the courtroom, for all of a proceeding. The
“proceeding” may be a granular one—a motion hearing, for
instance—it need not be an entire trial.27 A partial closure, on
the other hand, is one in which certain individuals are
excluded,28 or people are generally excluded, but only for a very
specific portion—the testimony of a particular witness, for
instance.29
The Supreme Court has never differentiated between, nor
used the terms, partial and complete closures. The terminology
26.
See Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that,
under Waller, insufficient space because of the size of the venire and the risk
of tainting the jury pool are not “compelling reasons” for closure).
27.
See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 210 (2010) (defining the
closure of voir dire as a proceeding).
28.
See United States v. Laureano-Perez, 797 F.3d 45, 77–79 (1st Cir.
2015).
29.
See State v. Turrietta, 308 P.3d 964, 967 (N.M. 2013).
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has taken hold in the lower courts, however, as a way of
distinguishing between closures that require close attention,
and those that are perhaps subject to more cursory analysis.
Most courts have applied a slightly different version of the
Waller test to partial closures.30 When “partial” closures are at
issue, they have diluted Waller’s “overriding” interest to require
only a “substantial” interest.31 This makes clear the lower
courts’ understanding that Waller applies strict scrutiny. These
courts have fashioned a form of intermediate scrutiny at the
interest phase of the tiered scrutiny approach.32
In practice, the “substantial reasons” courts have approved
as justifying partial courtroom closures are quite similar to the
“overriding interests” that have supported valid complete
closures.33 The same safety and emotional well-being interests
that are invoked as “overriding interests” have been recited as
“substantial reasons.”34
Despite this relatively long discursion into the distinction
between a complete closure of a COVID courtroom and a partial
one that might permit the attendance of some spectators, the
result should be the same. The public health reasons that justify
a total courtroom closure apply with even more force in a partial
closure situation, where Sixth Amendment concerns for fairness
and “sunlight” are less acute.35
In closure cases of all stripes, the government interest in
keeping people apart from one another in pursuit of reducing
30.
See United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Nearly all federal courts of appeals . . . have distinguished between the total
closure of proceedings and situations in which a courtroom is only partially
closed to certain spectators.”).
31.
See, e.g., Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying
the “substantial reason” test). But see Turrietta, 308 P.3d at 967 (holding
Waller’s “overriding interest” factor applies in partial closures excluding only
some courtroom spectators).
32.
See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2375 (2018) (describing intermediate scrutiny as requiring a substantial
interest).
33.
See Woods, 977 F.2d at 77 (finding both overriding interest and
substantial reason in closing for “protection of a witness who claims to be
frightened as a result of perceived threats”).
34.
See United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 99 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The
protection of a minor from emotional harm is a substantial enough reason to
defend a limited closing of the proceedings.”).
35.
See id.
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infections from the coronavirus is sufficient to justify the order.
There should be little more demanded of a judge managing a
COVID courtroom—the closure occurred in response to a
government interest of the first order.
B. Tailoring and Consideration of Alternatives to Closure
The next two factors of the Waller test are interrelated. The
second factor calls for the closure to be “no broader than
necessary.”36 The third requires that the court “must consider
reasonable alternatives” to closing the courtroom.37 Together,
they call upon the judge to craft a narrowly tailored closure, and
to consider alternatives to closure. The tailoring aspect of strict
scrutiny asks whether the means chosen to protect the
government interest at issue was the necessary one, or whether
other choices could have been made that would better protect
the constitutional right at issue.38
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Presley v. Georgia39
provides a helpful example of how a judge may tailor courtroom
management to protect the interest in a public trial. In Presley,
the trial judge had closed the courtroom to the public because
there just wasn’t “space,” and because he worried that the
defendant’s uncle, the lone spectator attending the trial, might
make prejudicial remarks that the close-quarters jurors might
hear.40
The Court indicated that it could easily hypothesize many
alternatives to closure: “some possibilities include reserving one
or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to
reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors
not to engage or interact with audience members.”41

36.

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
Id.
38.
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815
(2000) (explaining that a government action is not narrowly tailored if there
are less rights-restrictive alternatives available).
39.
558 U.S. 209 (2010).
40.
See id. at 210–11.
41.
Id. at 215; see also People v. Evans, 69 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ill. App. Ct.
2016) (“[W]e can conceive reasonable alternatives—many of which are based
in common sense.”).
37.
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If there are alternatives to closure, a trial court is expected
to resort to them first, not last. If there are other courtroom
management techniques, like those described in Presley, they
should be used in lieu of closure.
A COVID closure is categorically “no broader than
necessary,” and is the only “reasonable” response to the
government interest in public health. A courtroom is a physical
space, with physical limits. It is measurable in square feet. If a
group of people wants to honor the social distancing regimen
while occupying that space, it can do so only in certain
numbers.42 This requires the exclusion of people beyond those
numbers.
Alternatives are imaginable, but they are not reasonable
ones. Entrants into the courtroom could conceivably enter in
great numbers should they be in “hazmat”-style suits. Few
people have those. Courts are not equipped to dispense them.
Additionally, a court could administer testing, perhaps for the
disease, perhaps for antibodies. Aside from the invasion of
privacy this might induce, here, too, courts are not equipped.
They are not situated to engage in medical testing. Given the
practical restraints on a judge’s ability to reduce the possibility
of disease being spread in her courtroom, closure, complete or
partial, is the only tool at her disposal.
While there are no reasonable alternatives to closure in the
COVID courtroom, there is one subsidiary issue that will
require trial judge attention. When determining who should be
excluded, should there be room for any of the public, priority
should be given to people associated with the defendant. While
it is dicta, the Supreme Court has indicated that the accused is
entitled to have friends and family members present in the
courtroom.43

42.
Those numbers may change as our understanding changes. Today’s
six feet may be tomorrow’s two, or twenty.
43.
See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72 (1948) (“[W]ithout exception all
courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his
friends, relatives and counsel present . . . .”); see also United States v. Rivera,
682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012).

THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

11

C. Adequate Findings to Support Closure
Waller’s final demand is that a trial court “make findings
adequate to support the closure.”44 These findings must be
“specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether
the closure order was properly entered.”45 These findings do not
require a particular form of opinion or order.46
In the context of a COVID closure, this factor, too, is easily
satisfied. The public health crisis the world is presently
enduring may be judicially noticed.47 Once the court takes notice
of the public health crisis, resulting findings flow therefrom,
naturally. Acting to reduce the spread of the virus is an
indisputable “overriding interest.” Maintaining social distance
or separation is the necessary means of furthering that interest,
and no reasonable alternatives are available.
IV. Alternative Means of Serving the Purposes of the Right to a
Public Trial
While the application of the Waller test in the COVID era
demonstrates that closures to protect public health comply with
the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, there are additional
ways to assure that the values and purposes of the right to a
public trial are honored. A court ordering a Waller-compliant
closure may nonetheless provide additional procedural
protections for defendants subjected to closed proceedings. One
of these is already in place—trial transcripts. The other is video
recording of trial proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial exists to (1)
“ensur[e] that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties
44.
45.

Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
Presley, 558 U.S. at 215 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
46.
See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 172 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Waller
Court prescribed no particular format to which a trial judge must adhere to
satisfy the findings requirement.”).
47.
See FED. R. EVID. 201. The COVID crisis and social distancing
protocols are “generally known within [any] trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction.” See NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 911 (6th Cir. 1940)
(taking judicial notice of social conditions and noting that “[t]he court may not
close its eyes to what was referred to at the time by the then Governor of
Michigan, as ‘the greatest industrial conflict of all times’”).
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responsibly,” (2) “encourag[e] witnesses to come forward,” and
(3) “discourag[e] perjury.”48 “[T]he guarantee has always been
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution.”49 But the right was
conceived in a different time, one without the ability to
memorialize the details of a trial—stenographically, visually, or
aurally. Today, verbatim transcripts, audio recordings, and
video may provide the needed “sunlight” shed on trial
proceedings in a way that did not exist centuries ago. Because
of the availability of these many ameliorative processes, the
right to a public trial should probably be policed less rigorously
as a general matter, but should certainly be in this time of
emergency. Alternate means of publicizing a trial’s contents
may be constitutionally adequate, while benefitting our
present-day public health needs.
The first way to accommodate the concerns of the right to a
public trial is by ensuring the availability of transcripts (or,
perhaps, audiovisual recordings of some sort). To be sure, the
court has never said that the Sixth Amendment’s protection is
adequately safeguarded by transcripts, and transcripts were
surely available in Waller and Presley, cases in which the Court
held that the right had been violated. Nonetheless, a transcript
or other memorialization of trial proceedings necessarily
contributes to the good government goals of the right to a public
trial.50
Moreover, the Court has indicated that transcripts may be
constitutionally satisfactory in the First Amendment context of
the right of public access to a trial. The Court’s jurisprudence on
that right gave birth to the Waller test. Indeed, Waller’s
requirement of an “overriding interest” and narrow tailoring

48.
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984); see also Jocelyn Simonson,
The Criminal Court Audience in A Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173,
2177 (2014) (“[T]here is power in the act of observation: audiences affect the
behavior of government actors inside the courtroom, helping to define the
proceedings through their presence.”).
49.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
50.
See Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (noting
availability of transcript as a consideration in evaluating the validity of a
courtroom closure).
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was taken verbatim from a First Amendment press access case:
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court.51
Besides delivering its test to Waller, the Court also
indicated that transcripts were a means of providing
constitutionally required public access. It explained that “the
constitutional values sought to be protected by holding open
proceedings may be satisfied later by making a transcript of the
closed proceedings available within a reasonable time.”52
The Court had previously set forth a similar assessment of
the power of a transcript, noting that when a hearing transcript
was made available after the fact, “[t]he press and the public
then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the suppression
hearing. Unlike the case of an absolute ban on access, therefore,
the press here had the opportunity to inform the public of the
details of the pretrial hearing accurately and completely” and
the right of trial access under the First Amendment was not
violated.53
Besides the availability of transcripts to ensure that
nothing untoward happens in a closed trial proceeding, courts
might also further Sixth Amendment values by using cameras
to take recordings, or to simulcast trial proceedings.54 Again,
two purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial
are to “ensure a fair trial” and “remind the prosecutor and judge
of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their
functions.”55 Regarding the Sixth Amendment’s goal of keeping
trial participants on their best behavior, social behavior
51.
52.

464 U.S. 501 (1984).
Id. at 512. But see United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding transcripts were not a sufficient grant of access).
53.
See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979); In re The
Spokesman-Review, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1102 (D. Idaho 2008) (“Her
testimony will be forever memorialized in the written transcript, which the
Media and public will have access to and which will be more than sufficient to
satisfy the right of access.”).
54.
While the author’s research has not revealed any cases concluding
that cameras are an adequate substitute for a traditional public trial, at least
one court has found that requiring the public to remain in an “overflow room”
with a video feed available, rather than the courtroom itself, produced no
actionable closure at all. See United States v. Gutierrez-Calderon, No.
2016-0009, 2019 WL 3859753, at *11 (D.V.I. Aug. 16, 2019).
55.
Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Waller, 467
U.S. at 46–47).
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research indicates that, indeed, having spectators present at
trial may serve to improve the behavior of a trial’s essential
participants:
[T]he presence of others may affect human experience in
various ways: it can inhibit or facilitate public
performances; . . . and may trigger self-evaluations and
result in behavior adjustments. . . . In other words, the
presence of others can be seen as a social force, affecting
feelings, cognitions, and, to some degree, behaviors.56

The authors of this study proposed that the “implied
audience” provided by visible security cameras might have a
similar effect on behavior to actual audiences examined in
previous studies.57 And indeed, their results supported the
hypotheses “that security cameras can trigger public helping
behavior by implying the presence of an audience: participants
provided more help.”58
Although “helping behavior” may be distinguished in some
way from the ethical choices we hope that judges and
prosecutors will make when they are in front of an audience,
“helping,” and, say, not asking obviously objectionable questions
of a witness, both demonstrate pro-social impulses.59 It is
therefore conceivable—maybe even likely—that the implied
audience behind a camera lens will produce the same attention
to a trial participant’s responsibilities that a live audience might
produce.
Another study on security camera use similarly found an
increase in pro-social behavior when cameras were installed,
but noted that people exposed to cameras “may become
desensitized to the cameras over time, thus watering down the

56.
Thomas J. L. van Rompay, Dorette J. Vonk & Marieke L. Fransen,
The Eye of the Camera Effects of Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41
ENV’T & BEHAV. 60, 61–62 (2009) (citations omitted) (reviewing previous
research).
57.
Id. at 64.
58.
Id. at 68.
59.
Id. at 69 (“Although the motivation to help may be driven by
self-concern, that is, to ensure approval of others, cooperative behavior is
certainly desirable in many environmental settings.”).
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potential for long term deterrent gains.”60 One can only hope
that the requirement of COVID closures will not persist long
enough that trial participants reach a desensitized state.
In the ordinary course, the right to a public trial is not fully
realized by the availability of transcripts or the presence of
cameras. But in this time of COVID, when courtroom closures
are otherwise justifiable when viewed through Waller’s lens,
these tools provide a “backstop,” a check to ensure that the
values of the right are honored, in some degree.
V. Conclusion
Although the Waller test anticipates a case-by-case review
of courtroom closure decisions, COVID closures should lend
themselves to almost categorical approval. The strong
governmental interest in public health is the same from case to
case; there can be no difference in the analysis of that factor.
Moreover, in terms of tailoring, there are few tools for a court to
deploy in lieu of closure, partial or complete. Add to these easily
satisfied (under these circumstances) criteria the protection of
alternative means of making proceedings publicly available,
and closures should not be considered the obstacle they might
be in normal times. A court should not be required to take
courtroom measurements—of space, of participants, of
furniture—to determine with precision the physical distance
between essential participants and would-be spectators. No
math should be required of a judge—trying to both hear a trial
and maintain safety—to determine if, just maybe, an extra
person could have fit inside the room. It is by now a truism that
“while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual
rights, it is not a suicide pact.”61

60.
Lorraine Mazerolle, David Hurley & Mitchell Chamlin, Social
Behavior in Public Space: An Analysis of Behavioral Adaptations to CCTV, 15
SECURITY J. 59, 72 (2002).
61.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the
Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”).

